

SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #01338-84
28 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: David McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED]
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

STAT

SUBJECT: Monthly Forecast and Warning Report -- USSR-EE

1. Soviet Policy Toward PakistanA. Discussion:

Recently there have been indications that Moscow may have begun a more aggressive policy aimed at getting Pakistan to halt its support to the Afghan resistance. The most significant development occurred in late January when the Afghan fighter planes attacked the Mujahideen camp in Angur Adda -- the most serious cross border incident since the USSR invaded Afghanistan. This attack was preceded by warnings to Zia [REDACTED] threatening joint Soviet-Afghan actions against Pakistan. The Soviets also have waged a strident media campaign aimed at appealing to India's animosity.

25X1

25X1

Despite these signs, we know of no developments inside Afghanistan, or changed views in the Soviet leadership that would have made the current pace of the war there, frustrating though it is, so intolerable as to call for a major escalation of pressure on Islamabad. At the same time Zia seems to have withered recent trouble and looks less vulnerable.

25X1

SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

2. Soviet Policy Toward Lebanon/Syria

A. Discussion:

In general, the situation in Lebanon is positive for the Soviets. Two of their major objectives have been accomplished -- the removal of US forces from Beirut and the prevention of a US sponsored peace settlement. Nonetheless, Moscow continues to face fundamental obstacles to expansion and consolidation of its influence in the area. Israel remains in Lebanon and the Soviets will be concerned with the potential for Israeli military action there. Lacking firm control of Syria, the Soviets are opposed to total Syrian control of Lebanon. Differing Syrian and Soviet goals vis-a-vis Lebanon are likely to emerge and Moscow will be weary of any Syrian attempts to strike a deal with the U.S. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] There seems to be no urgency for Moscow to make immediate policy departures in the area.

25X1

SECRET [REDACTED]

- 2 -

25X1

SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

3. Chernenko: Prospects:A. Discussion:

The immediate post-Andropov leadership will likely emphasize collectivity and continuity. We do not anticipate a renunciation of Andropov's political or economic reform programs. However, the slow-paced efforts on economic reform are likely to be even slower and there probably will be some easing off the anti-corruption campaign. While Chernenko has used the rhetoric of detente as a partisan of Brezhnev, there is no reason to believe he is dissatisfied with current Soviet policies. Nonetheless, there has been an effort to tone down the anti-American rhetoric and to project a willingness to negotiate. We have yet to see what substance may lie behind this rhetoric.

25X1

[REDACTED]
(for) Fritz W. Ermarth

25X1

SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

Page Denied